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Relative Indemnity: Risk, Insurance, and Kinship in Indian Microfinance 'Sir, there is someone who wants a loan.' Surrounded by a small pile of yellow passbooks, Joy, the loan officer, glanced up from filling out the ledgers for the day's collections. 1 We were at a microfinance group meeting in Kolkata, India. Joy and I were seated on the lofted single bed, the only piece of furniture save the narrow almirah in one corner. The sole window to the room overlooked the entrance to the house next door. A small child clung to the window bars, observing the ongoing proceedings. The 'someone' was Krishna, a woman in her late 40s, her greying hair pulled into a neat bun, who stood at the entrance. her jamai be the guarantor if he is willing?' Sighing, Joy thought for a second, finally speaking: 'Can't your daughter take the loan instead? It will make things easier with her age and guarantor.' Krishna nodded, going off to find her daughter to put in the loan application.
Bad sons, good daughters, mothers cared and uncared for; microfinance loans not only operate through kinship networks, but also produce new forms of relationality in the service of financial profits. For Krishna, what is under scrutiny is not just financial, but also filial accountability. Commercial microfinance institutions (MFIs) in India often require women to have male kin guarantors in order to access loans that are ostensibly designed for women's empowerment.
These guarantors are typically the borrower's husband, but it can also be an adult son (18 and above), brother, or if age permits, a father or father-in-law. 2 This stipulation for male guarantors to access loans both binds families together and discloses places where they fall apart. As microfinance loans are normalized in the urban poor neighborhoods of Kolkata, they have brought kinship relations under the gaze of financial institutions. What I call 'relations of guarantee' do not simply mirror kinship as a formal structure; rather, they call upon both borrowers and guarantors to also continuously reflect upon and provide signs of this relationship as it is lived for MFIs to assess. They reveal how underlying familial relationships are speculated upon and transformed by the process of financialization.
Over the past decade, commercial or for-profit microfinance has rapidly proliferated in India, drawing the poor into networks of financialized debt. MFIs offer small loans to poor women, which are repaid usually in weekly installments.
The loans are intended to create independent women entrepreneurs who will use the loans for productive purposes, enabling both social and economic empowerment. 3 In effect, by challenging the existing distribution of credit, microfinance promises social change. However, the loans have also enabled the expansion of finance to the 'bottom billion' of banking. These new forms of financial speculation are undergirded by and often reinforce existing forms of social structure, including kinship. Kinship and domestic life are, in other words, wound into the concerns of systemic risk, becoming objects and tools of financial 3 risk management.
Anthropologists have long debated kinship, whether as a structural system or in terms of its everyday enactments and relations (e.g., Carsten 2004; Faubion 2001; Levi-Strauss 1969; Sahlins 2011; Strathern 2005) . The MFI staff, in attempting to contain the risks of lending, also opens up kinship to similar forms of scrutiny and analysis. The system of guarantors seeks to manage risk by reflecting and indeed capitalizing on existing patriarchal kinship structures. Yet MFIs are aware of how borrowers live kinship in ways that might differ from normative expectations, and are vigilant of changes in such relations and obligations. Meanwhile, in their search for guarantors, borrowers themselves consider kinship in terms of structure and practice. Financial speculation and abstraction requires that borrowers and lenders both enact and concretize kinship relations as forms of indemnity.
This article shows how microfinance weaves through the complex networks of kinship relations as women negotiate familial obligations to manage this debt, both in terms of its access and recovery. These negotiations include finding male kin guarantors as part of the loan process, as well as convincing family members to borrow on one's behalf when guarantors are not readily available. Borrowers not only use existing familial bonds to access loans, but also actively produce new or fictive forms of relationality through debt. For the MFI, kinship provides a kind of insurance against debt default, but even this is ultimately financialized in life insurance policies. Life insurance, however, also demonstrates the tension and limits between the fiscal and relational demands of familial responsibility. Financialization is the growing importance of finance as a source of profit over production in the global economy (Krippner 2012) , and its increasing influence on daily life (Martin 2002) . With the shift from industrial capitalism, risk and speculation are increasing at the heart of profit (LiPuma and Lee 2002; Sunder Rajan 2005) . Studies in the anthropology of finance have recently focused on the elite spaces such as investment bankers, lawyers, and traders (e.g., Ho 2009; Miyazaki 2013; Riles 2011; Zaloom 2006) . However, there is less on the ways in which the poor are enfolded into these circuits of finance and their consequences (cf. Elyachar 2005) . Kolkata has undergone deindustrialization over the past three decades and has an increasingly precarious labor market (Bagchi 1998; Gooptu 5 2009) . Here, in the absence and stagnation of wages, credit is not only a vital way for the urban poor to make ends meet, but is also an increasingly productive site of accumulation.
Financial Speculation and Systemic Risk
While the rapid expansion of finance into the lives of the poor has required speculation on a new market, it has also been accompanied by new mechanisms of risk management. Speculation and risk management are two sides of the coin through which finance capital has entered and reshaped the lives of those at the margins. The growth of the financial system has influenced not just economic life, 
Photographing Intimacy
All microfinance borrowers are issued a small passbook to document transactions.
Glued on the front page of every passbook is a 'joint photo,' or a passport-sized photograph of a man and a woman-the borrower and her guarantor. In most pictures the pair gaze back, seriously, unsmilingly (cf. Pinney 1997). These are 'public-use portraits' used for purposes of identification, rather than 'private-use portraits' (Werner 2001) . In one case, a prospective borrower produced, much to the bemusement of the loan officer and other members of the group, a full-sized portrait for her joint photo. She was instructed to retake the photograph in the appropriate passport size. As microfinance has spread, the small passport-sized joint photos have become normalized in India as a particular form of 'public-use' photo.
Once a loan application is accepted, the MFI requires two copies of a joint photo:
one is for the MFI's files, while the other is attached to the passbook issued to the borrower. Borrowers bring their passbooks to the group meetings, during which 9 loan officers collect the week's repayment to document the amount repaid and the amount outstanding. Rarely does the loan officer check the photo against the
borrower. Yet as a requirement for most MFIs in India, pictures sometimes go missing as borrowers circulate them for applications to other MFIs. Beyond a slight reprimand, there is little consequence for these missing photographs.
Moreover, as part of the loan application process, potential borrowers are required to provide various kinds of identification, including state-recognized photo identifications, such as a voter identification card or a tax identification card. Given these other forms of identification, why require a joint photograph?
It was an off-hand comment from Putul, a branch manager at DENA, that signaled the role of the joint photograph in microfinance practices. As we entered the room where the meeting was being held, a man with a stack of passbooks sat counting the money that had been sent. Further, this photograph works to objectivize the photographed person's body, and 'turns out to make a subject aware of his/her own individuality' (Werner 2001: 263) . The joint-photo, however, projects a different kind of person. Rather than the individual, it comes to represent the 'dividual,' encouraging the photographed to think of themselves as persons 'constructed as the plural and composite site of the relationships that produced them' (Strathern 1990: 13) . The process of getting the photograph taken requires not just institutional or bureaucratic recognition, but also 'social certification' (Gaibazzi 2014: 40) that would enable borrowers to make claims upon guarantors.
In order to get these photos taken, borrowers must go to a studio. These are occasions that require time, and more significantly, produce certain forms of intimacy. The joint photograph is less significant as a material object, than as the photographic encounter produced through the process. The photograph is a 'space of appearance in which an encounter has been recorded between human beings, an encounter neither concluded nor determined at the moment it was being photographed' (Azioulay 2010: 252) . It is this encounter that the MFI seeks to capture and confirm when they demand that borrowers provide joint photos; this moment when the borrower and her guarantor acknowledge each other in the intimate space and under the gaze of the photographer.
The relationships of guarantee that are to be captured by the joint photo-despite the serious countenance most images portray-is that of intimacy. Whether between wife and husband, mother and son, or sister and brother, the photograph is both produced in a space of and as a reminder of familial love (cf. Inden & Nicolas 2005) . The joint photo becomes a form of mediation, or the 'conceptual, technical, and linguistic practices by which the actually irreducible particularities of our experience are, apparently, reduced' (Mazzarella 2006: 476) . The photograph serves less as proof of identity than as confirmation or evidence of the intangible intimacy between kin, and ultimately of obligation in this debt relationship. The process of getting the joint photograph taken, as well as the material object, calls the borrower to reflect on and reinforce the relationship of guarantee that is captured in the image.
Even while capturing a unit beyond the individual, the joint photograph cuts the duo from other relationships in which a borrower is embedded. The photo documents and enforces a heteronormative and patriarchal ideal (cf. Bedford 2005) . The photograph of the borrower and her guarantor offers a static and idealized view of the relationship. What is constituted in the relationship between husband and wife, mother and son, or brother and sister, however, is often much more complicated set of negotiations and relations. On the one hand, the MFI hedges its risks on the expectations of these static relations; on the other, it also recognizes that these are not unchanging bonds. Rather, the domestic life and kin relations become objects of intense scrutiny for MFI staff in the attempt to manage emergent risks.
Gendered Guarantee
"I don't know how to cook or clean or do anything," giggled Munni, a young Bihari woman. She wanted a loan for her business selling readymade clothes.
Mukul, the branch manager, asked why she needed a loan if her husband had a salaried job. "Why shouldn't I have loan?" Munni shot back. "Because I married for love [prem kore] to a man who has a job?" she demanded. For Mukul, that
Munni would choose to run a business when her husband and guarantor had a dependable salaried job was suspicious. Munni, with youthful defiance, demanded to know why she should be excluded from access to loans based on her husband's income. Negotiations such as these framed the ways in which microfinance often reinforced rather than challenged gendered relations of dependence.
While premised on women's empowerment, the requirement by MFIs for male guarantors is particularly perplexing. In response to my question about why borrowers had to have male guarantors, Mr. Guha, the deputy general manager at DENA, explained: 'We are giving loans to ladies, and almost every man is working. If it is a lady guarantor, then pressure will have to go to the lady. It is better to have a male.' For Mr. Guha, there are two main reasons for having male guarantors: First, men were more likely to be employed and to have a regular income to ensure repayment. Second, he invokes female fragility in face of possibly coercive repayment pressures.
On the first point, there was a financial imperative for the MFI to confirm that there would be a male source of income to finance the repayment of the loan. In a different conversation, a loan officer explained that the reason for having male guarantors was so that a husband could not later say that he did not know his wife was taking a loan, and forbid her from repaying it. On the second point, Mr. 
Domestic Interruptions
One morning, I was accompanying Anand, a branch manager, on his daily rounds to group meetings. We were in front of the locked house where the next meeting was to be held. Another borrower, Kabita, turned up as we waited, saying that Daisy, the woman whose house served as the MFI meeting center, had gone to buy fish at the market. 'Why did she go shopping now?' demanded Anand. 'She should know to go early or after the meeting.' 'And you know her, she'll take forever to get back; probably talking to people, and you know. The requirement for a male guarantor also revealed the fractures in Krishna's familial life, as noted in the opening vignette. Because sons are the traditional caregivers for a widowed mother in Bengali society, the absence of her son was noticed. Moreover, a daughter is thought to have a 'more fragile relationship with her aging parents,' (Lamb 2000: 83) once she is married. After marriage, gifts are expected to flow from a woman's natal home to her marital one (Fruzzetti 1982) .
A son-in-law is supposed to be treated with reverence and respect by his in-laws, though this is a more formal and distanced kind of relationship. For Krishna, the loan mediated a new kind of relationship with her daughter, and ultimately, her son-in-law. The loan would be made to her daughter with her son-in-law as guarantor, and she would be able to access it only informally through her daughter. Of course, the loan was not the only factor in shaping Krishna's broken relationship with her son, and existing relationship with her daughter. Because of the requirement of the male guarantor, however, Krishna had to publicly acknowledge these shifting kin relations and domestic problems in ways that caused her distress.
MFIs-as with the responses of loan officers to Daisy's and Krishna's circumstances-recognized that kinship relations were not static; women's bonds with their husbands, sons, and brothers were constantly being made and unmade.
During meetings, if a borrower's husband's ill health came up, loan officers would quickly inquire on the seriousness of it. In other cases, a husband reaching retirement created concern MFI staff, seeking out adult sons to replace the father as guarantor. MFIs thus contend with the 'internal precariousness' (Pinto 2011: 380) of kinship. For Krisnha the requirement of the male guarantor made her simultaneously acknowledge the relationship that had fallen apart with her son, and to forge a new bond with her daughter and son-in-law. For MFIs, creditability of a borrower depended on her being able to produce evidence of stable relations of guarantee. In its sudden absence, as in the case of Daisy, the MFI staff searched for evidence in her domestic life that she remained financially viable as a borrower. Unlike formal sector banking that might take into account familial income and guarantors at the time of lending, loan officers constantly assess the domestic life of borrowers for signs of turbulence where the relations of guarantee might come undone.
Brothers Seeking Sisters
MFIs typically lend only to women, premised on the notion that access to credit facilitates women's empowerment. Yet implicit on this focus on women is also a critique of poor men. Debjani, who worked in communications section of another MFI, explained to me that they lent to women 'because the behavior and personality of poor Indian women is focused first on responsibility toward the family. She cannot think about herself solely, but thinks about her children.' After extolling the virtues of Indian women, Debjani continued: 'Men, particularly of the 'lower strata' of the population, tend to booze and drink and gamble. We need to have proper utilization of funds.' Against the formulation of poor responsible women are 'incapable men' (Ray & Qayum 2009: 127) , or men who lack the financial and moral discipline necessary to ensure loan recovery. While male guarantors ensure income to repay the loan, women as borrowers are expected to ensure fiscal discipline to repay the loans. Such classed and gendered forms of lending can have unintended outcomes, as poor men who are excluded from access to microfinance programs seek out women to gain access to these loans. Of course, this sister would also have to manage her own relationships of debt to ensure that she could take a loan on behalf of her brother, and not one for her husband. The gendered practices of microfinance lending create complicated debt relationships between parents or in-laws and children, as well as between siblings.
Ironically, Abdul actually had a loan from DENA that was just ending. He previously had a larger 'business loan' from the MFI that was repaid on a monthly basis with higher interest and also available to men. Due to a crisis in the microfinance sector, however, DENA temporarily suspended its business loan program. 8 Given Abdul's credit history with the business loan, the MFI staff was eager to keep him as a client. Consequently, DENA encouraged Abdul to seek out female kin through whom he could access the regular loan.
Microfinance, despite its emphasis on empowering women, reinforces the dichotomy in access to credit: small loans for women, large loans for men (Rajeev et al. 2011) . 9 Microfinance programs do not cover the gap in unequal access to formal credit by poor women-headed households (i.e., households without an adult male income-earner). Similarly, for many of my informants, microfinance did not so much replace moneylenders as produce a new gendered structure of borrowing within the household. In the emerging and expanding system of gendered debt, poor men borrow from moneylenders and, where available, larger formal sector loans, while poor women borrow from MFIs. Men as guarantors
were not simply bystanders to female borrowers; rather, they were central to the process of seeking out loans for the household. Moreover, the system of guarantors produced new forms of relationships, not just between brothers and sisters, or in-laws, but also in terms of fictive kin.
Producing Fictive Kin
While husbands and sons are the preferred guarantors by MFIs, they also accept other male kin, including brothers. In the absence of any male kin who will serve as a guarantor, women will mobilize channels of communication among friends and neighbors to create fictive kin (cf. Elyachar 2010). Take for instance, the case of Panchali. One morning, Anand had gone to conduct a 'house verification' for Panchali, who was widowed and ran a small 'hotel,' as roadside eateries were referred to in Bengali. 10 She lived in a room she rented from Deepa, another borrower in the group. Despite being successful in her own enterprise-the ostensible goal of microfinance-and creditworthy in the view of the MFI staff, Panchali still had to seek out and produce and formalize fictive male kin, who would sign as her guarantor for the loan. She had to produce these relationships indirectly through her friend and landlady Deepa. In Panchali's case, the MFI staff's response reflects a degree of flexibility with regulations on male guarantors. Recognizing that she was a good client, they were willing to knowingly accept Deepa's brother as her guarantor.
I asked Nilima, a loan officer, about what women who had no male kin did to access loans. Nilima's answer reflected the frequency with which and the reason why women would present fictive kin in the form of a brother:
She can get a brother to be a guarantor. But you know, when a woman gets married, then her name is going to be different from her brother's. So, she could have anyone say that he was her brother, and we wouldn't necessarily know the difference. Of course, we try to tell them that they have the responsibility to pay back the loan if his name is on as the guarantor.
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Women without male kin maneuver around the requirement of guarantors by exploiting the perceived static structure of kinship. Kinship, writes Strathern, 'appears where one can imagine-make an abstract image of-the relative of a relative, relationships between relationships. Kinship appears again where people make an imperative out of so doing. The imperative is logical and moral at the same time ' (2005: 8) . With the search for male guarantors, borrowers reflect on the structures of Bengali kinship-that women change their name at marriagebefore mobilizing fictive kin who can fit into the categories. Neighbors and friends, like brothers with whom married women no longer share a name, can readily be called upon to act as the male guarantor.
In practice, neighbors and friends may be more integral to a person's life than their real kin (Schneider 1980) . In imagining these new relations and producing 
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In cases where women have no male kin to serve as guarantors, the requirement suddenly appears as arbitrary. The requirement of a male guarantor can insert women into gender-normative relations of dependence where there are none.
Though the guarantor is meant to provide additional indemnity, the production of fictive kin in order to access the loans can flip the directions of obligation. The mechanism for reducing risk for the MFI can produce new kinds of social risks for women borrowers who must seek out men to access the microfinance loans.
Insuring Relations
It was the final group meeting of the day. We were in an old slum neighborhood in the north of the city. Houses lined the narrow slope, and the meeting was in a room above leather-working workshop. Labony came forward to talk to the MFI staff, not to repay her loan, but to inquire about insurance. Labony's husband, had recently been killed in an accident. A ceiling fan had hit her husband on the head, cracking his skull. The recently widowed borrower needed assurance from the loan officers that she would not have to pay off the remainder of the loan. As families grieved, they simultaneously had to account for the financial losses encumbered by these deaths and ways to manage them. MFI practices also acknowledge these familial losses. Just as the lens widens to include not only the borrower but also the guarantor in the joint photograph, life insurance policies attached to loans cover guarantors, recognizing the wider social networks in which an individual is located.
MFIs increasingly require borrowers to buy a mandatory life insurance policy at the time of getting a loan. At DENA, life insurance is a requirement for a loan.
With higher mortality rates related to lower socio-economic status in India (Po & Subramanian 2011) , the risk of lending to the poor is not simply that of lower 23 income, but also of higher death rates. Life insurance becomes a mechanism for
MFIs to both take the risk of lending to the poor, while simultaneously managing this risk (cf. Simon & Baker 2002) . Although technically a separate financial product, the life insurance policy is quite often tacked on as an additional fee, leading to a proliferation of financial products for the poor.
At DENA, life insurance fees were charged at one percent of the total loan. The Even as MFIs use insurance, they also manage higher insurance costs through age limits to lending. The implicit rationale of these limits was to reduce the risk of lending to older people with higher mortality rates. The cutoff for women to get loans was 50, while men could serve as guarantors until the age of 60, given that husbands would typically be older than their wives. Older women, however, would often be encouraged to have sons serve as guarantors, even when their husband was alive, thereby lowering the mortality risks of the guarantor.
Strategies for selecting a guarantor can have unexpected outcomes. One afternoon, as we sat in the branch office, Putul went over the recent files claiming insurance. I asked her if there were many claims. 'Yes,' she replied. 'Just today, somebody died. It was a borrower's husband, but her guarantor was her son, so she won't be able to claim the insurance.' On the one hand, life insurance enables MFIs to take the added risk of lending to the poor given higher mortality rates.
On the other, they constantly try to minimize the risk of insurance payouts through age cutoffs and encouragement that borrowers get sons rather than older husbands to serve as guarantors. This institutional tension of both taking and containing risk can ultimately obfuscate the realities of borrowers' lives, in which they are quite often dependent on both incomes of husbands and working-age sons. Moreover, given high levels of youth unemployment in West Bengal, a 25 younger son may not actually be employed. The MFI attempts to align the relations of guarantee in a way that minimizes insurance risk. Such practices, however, fail to account for the realities of familial life and household structures.
Financial Risk and Ethical Responsibility
While reducing the risks of lending to the poor, life insurance also overdetermines financial risk over ethical modes of being for borrowers. Take, for instance, the case of Chhabi, a pregnant borrower. Chhabi came up to Samit, the loan officer, at the end of one meeting to talk about closing her account, because she would not be able to get a new loan. As she did, she turned to me and expressed her frustration with not being allowed to take a loan:
I need the money right now, and I would take a loan. She appeals to the actual relationship with her husband that is backing the loan; it is the very relationality that the MFI is trying to captitalize on when it requires the male guarantor.
Writing of life insurance in the United States in the Nineteenth century, Viviana Zelizer (1978) has argued that it was not death that became profane through the new financial instrument. Instead, insurance became sacred, a way for men to ensure a good death. Similarly, microfinance practices rework rather than override existing ideas of relationality. In particular, borrowers often sought out MFIs that offered life insurance as a way to protect their families from the possible burden of debt. Thus, MFIs work through practices of care in kinship to make lending to the poor profitable and sustainable, but increasingly through financial mechanisms such as life insurance.
As it further financializes kinship relations through the use of life insurance, however, the MFI replaces the ethical obligations with a calculative one. The calculations fail to account for the precariousness of life, where pregnancy for a poor woman is certainly risky. In contrast, Chhabi's retort that her husband would take on the responsibility of repaying the loan calls for the recognition of social obligations. Such moments reveal the tensions of recoding kinship through finance with the prevailing ethics of kinship (cf. Bear 2015) . While Chhabi seeks to be part of the financialized system of debt through access to microfinance, she also attempts to remind the MFI staff that it is a moral and relational obligation for her husband to repay her loan.
Securitizing credit, securing kinship
That families offer forms of financial security is not new or unsurprising. Access 
